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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to create a prediction model to distinguish between 
government supported start-up firms becoming permanently insolvent and surviving. To 
achieve this, financial ratios from one and two years after foundation are applied for 
newly founded Estonian firms, all of which received a start-up grant in the period 2004-
2009. Data are derived from Enterprise Estonia, Estonian Business Register and Estonian 
Tax and Customs Board. The results indicate, that financial ratios two years after 
foundation are most efficient in discriminating between failed and survived firms. 
Namely, higher profitability and liquidity increase the likelihood of survival. The 
prediction model composed in this study outperforms known bankruptcy prediction 
models. 
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Introduction 
One action that helps government boost its economy is handing out governmental start-
up grants. This has a positive effect as it helps to create new jobs and increases tax 
revenue. As Lukason and Masso (2010) noted in their research, the firms that received 
start-up grant between 2005 and 2008, had paid more labor taxes compared to the sum of 
the grant, therefore indicating the positive net impact of grants on the state’s fiscal 
position. 
Start-up grants are paid out by certain rules that are set with the government regulations. 
The applicants would have to create a business plan and among other documents a 
prediction of its future cash flows. Most of the applicants plan a lot of secured revenues 
and leave no room for error. Laitinen (1992) wrote, that newly founded firms are typically 
highly indebted already in the first stages of business operations. Thus, they have to plan 
a lot of revenues to pay their financial obligations, when the availability of share capital 
is limited. Unfortunately, there are always some failures, which appear in the form of 
insolvency (Lukason, Masso 2010) and are followed by declaring the ending of business. 
The ability to identify or predict that firm is heading towards failure is important for 
bankers, investors, creditors and even for the distressed firms themselves, whether in the 
beginning of handing out loan and making an investment or in case of purchasing an 
operating firm. It has been an important research topic in accounting, auditing and finance 
for the last four decades (Cheng et al. 2006; Lee et al. 1996).  
Insolvency could be the result of different causes and it strikes companies temporarily as 
a common occurrence. In some cases, it persists and becomes permanent. Permanent 
insolvency will finally bankrupt the company.  
Literature regards insolvency as a specific type of corporate failure. One of the first 
definition of corporate failure was provided by Altman (1968), who declared it to be in 
relation to ceased operations, bankruptcy claiming and above all going out of business. 
The reason for failure lies in different aspects, but it all comes down to the lack of existent 
cash inflows. Bariatti and van Galen (2014) suggest that insolvency would occur in two 
different forms: 
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a) Cash flow insolvency – a debtor does not manage to pay all of its liabilities in 
fixed term and will not be able to do that in the future; 
b) Balance sheet insolvency – excess of liabilities over assets, which refers to 
financial distress. 
Permanent insolvency could be predicted by the same way as bankruptcy and there are 
plenty of prediction models that have been created and have been applied in practice (for 
literature reviews, see e.g. Altman 1968; Laitinen 1991; Gaeremynck, Willekens 2003; 
Altman et al. 2014). Unfortunately, they are based on and applicable to only a certain 
region, because of differences in legislation, taxation and distribution of subsidies. 
Failure process, which ends with bankruptcy could be a time consuming process (Laitinen 
et al. 2014). The whole trial, including insolvency proceeding, could take more than five 
years, which is longer than the period observed in this paper. As written in Estonian 
bankruptcy law, bankruptcy means the insolvency of a debtor declared by a court ruling. 
In other words, a debtor is insolvent, if the debtor is unable to satisfy the claims of 
creditors and such inability, due to the debtor’s financial situation, is not temporary (Eesti 
Vabariigi pankrotiseadus 2003). 
This research includes court declared permanent insolvencies as well as insolvency 
proceedings. The phases of failure by Crutzen and van Caillie (2008), list permanent 
insolvency as the phase number three, prior to and a presumption of bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, Mackevicius et al. (2010) conclude that considering the legal and economic 
aspects of insolvency, the terms enterprise insolvency or bankruptcy are used, and that 
models for bankruptcy prediction also serve as a forecasting models of a possible 
insolvency. 
Literature about start-up firms mainly focuses on its ability to survive. Different 
quantitative and qualitative variables have been applied to evaluate firms’ survival 
prospects. Earlier studies regarding start-up firms’ performance started to emerge in 
1990’s and focused on both, the quantitative and qualitative factors, like financial and 
human capital (Cooper et al. 1994; Honig 1998). On the other hand, the latest academic 
research on this matter are focused more on the qualitative factors. For example, some 
(Hyytinen et al. 2015; BarNir 2012) used innovativeness as a variable, while others 
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(Driga, Prior 2010; BarNir 2012) used gender of the start-up entrepreneur to assess the 
firms’ ability to survive. 
The goal of this research is to create a model that is capable of predicting permanent 
insolvency in the example of start-up enterprises financed with start-up grant in Estonia. 
The author creates a pool of data based on firms, which have received governmental start-
up grant in the first year of its existence during the period of 2004-2009. The initial pool 
consists of 2855 start-up firms and will be reduced after applying different criteria, which 
will be explained in the data and methodology section. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section will cover a brief literature 
review on the topic and it is divided into three major subjects: start-up grants and their 
effect, start-up enterprise and its failure process and finally a review of different 
prediction models. Section three presents the regulations behind governmental start-up 
grants as well as introduces the data that is used in the empirical analysis. In addition to 
previous, the methodology of the statistical analysis is covered in the same section. 
Section four presents the results from statistical analysis and the article ends with 
conclusive remarks in section five. 
Literature Review 
Start-up Grants and Their Effect 
The effect of start-up grant on firms’ financial performance would help to indicate which 
ratios should be used. Unfortunately, there is not an abundance of papers about the effect 
of start-up grants. For instance, foreign researchers Girma et al. (2010) proved, that start-
up grants have a positive effect on the initial size of the manufacturing plants. The grant 
receipt encourages plants to start-up with more employment than otherwise. Caliendo et 
al. (2010) concluded with their research, that governmental start-up grants have positive 
effect on self-employment and increases the percentage of its occurrence. 
Estonian researchers, Lukason and Masso (2010), examined local enterprises, after 
receiving a start-up grant, how would they manage to follow the plans they compiled prior 
to receiving grants. The results indicated, that many firms could not meet their reported 
goals and more than half of them had tax arrears. Another paper on start-up grants was 
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composed by Vildo and Masso (2009), where they studied the impact of local start-up 
grants on firm performance. The results showed that the grants tend to positively affect 
the number of employed people and turnover. 
Start-up Enterprise and Its Failure Process 
Financing is a key concern for start-up firms, but they must also create a long-term growth 
instead of focusing merely on survival (Tanrisever et al. 2012). An increasing amount of 
literature focuses on the decision models involving the financing and operations of start-
up firms (Erzurumlu et al. 2011; Joglekar, Levesque 2009). This should guide young 
entrepreneurs through the decisions increasing start-up’s survival and ultimately prevent 
the young firm from defaulting. 
The entrepreneurship literature has long recognized the fact that start-up firms have an 
unequal chance of getting adequate finance at their inception due to the fact, that capital 
markets are favoring larger and older firms, which are recognized as generally financially 
transparent (Girma et al. 2010). Laitinen (1992) has said, that the rate of mortality among 
newly founded firms is very high and more than half of them will fail during their first 
five years of business in the form of insolvency or bankruptcy. 
Thornhill and Amit (2003) found that the reasons behind start-up’s and an older 
company’s bankruptcy may differ. Younger entrepreneurs lack of resources and 
capabilities, while older entrepreneurs tend to fail in adjusting with the ever-changing 
business environment and competitive situation. Henderson (1999), who also studied the 
relations between company’s bankruptcy and its newness, came to a conclusion that the 
liability of newness is the result of lacking an established relationship with customers, 
vendors, creditors and other companies, while they still have limited funding.  
In addition, the possibility to default is also affected by the size of the company. Aldrich 
and Auster (1986) stated that small size makes survival problematic. The liability of 
smallness is caused by the lack of financial resources and reserves, which makes these 
companies to default whenever the economy or the market falls (Strotmann 2007). On the 
other hand, it has an upside, as a small company is more innovative and can react faster 
on the changes of the market. 
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The liability of smallness is often coupled with the liability of newness. Start-up 
companies have to face both of these liabilities. From the two of them, the effect of 
newness has more impact on the company’s performance (Halliday et al. 1987), because 
entrepreneurs lack of experience in optimizing the operative and strategic business 
processes (Kale, Arditi 1998). 
Permanent Insolvency Prediction Models 
There have not been previous studies in the field of predicting permanent insolvency 
among start-up firms that received governmental start-up grant. Furthermore, there is 
none in the example of newly founded Estonian micro-enterprises.  
Insolvency in current assessment tends to be as scarce topic in academic literature as the 
effects of governmental start-up grants. The closest research to Estonian market about 
insolvency and its prediction model was composed by Altman et al. (2014), where they 
assess the classification performance of Altman’s Z´´-Score using logistic regression 
analysis. What makes this research valuable for this paper, is the fact that the study used 
Estonian companies in its large international sample. Second research worth mentioning 
was carried out by Mackevicius in collaboration with Sneidere (2010), where they 
concluded the research with recommending to test the insolvency symptoms every year 
after preparation of the financial report. In addition, they stated that Altman’s Z`` model 
can be used for analyzing financial reports of Latvian enterprises.  
Balcean and Ooghe (2006) reviewed 43 different models of business failure prediction 
and classified these models into four categories: univariate, risk index, multivariate 
discriminant analysis (MDA) and conditional probability models. The most popular 
model was MDA, which was used in 21 different prediction studies. Gissel, et al. (2006), 
Jackson and Wood (2013) and Makeeva and Neretina (2013) got the same results in their 
review of frequently occurred forecasting techniques in prior literature. The second most 
common technique was the logit model. 
According to Megan and Circa (2014), all these models are potentially able to identify 
the financial variables, that are statistically significant in distinguishing entities that will 
file for insolvency from the entities that will not file for insolvency. 
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Dimitras et al. (1996) note that methods for predicting business failure commonly use 
three inputs: sampling and data collection; method selection and specification of 
variables. Variables and sample determine the method that should be used. Therefore, 
logit-model has its advantages over MDA as it does not require normally distributed 
predictors, nor the variance-covariance matrices of the predictors to be the same for both 
groups (failed and survived firms) (Ohlson 1980; Laitinen et al. 2014). This is confirmed 
by Lennox (1999), who’s paper argued, that well-specified logit model can identify 
failing companies more accurately than discriminant analysis. 
Bankruptcy prediction has been a field of research for many decades by now and multiple 
models have been conducted over time (Lensberg et al. 2006; Balcean, Ooghe 2006; 
Berzkalne, Zelgalve 2013). The composition of bankruptcy prediction models started to 
develop after Beaver’s (1966) univariate study, as he compared 30 ratios of 158 firms that 
were divided into two equal groups of failed and survived businesses. Outcome of the 
research stated that the highest predictive ability (78% accuracy one year prior to failure) 
was secured by the factor of cash flow to total debt (Beaver 1966). Nevertheless, his 
univariate method to predict bankruptcy was seldom followed, because while one variable 
would imply for failure another could imply survival (Sharma 2001). 
The necessity of bankruptcy prediction models and their application potential is justified 
as follows: 
1) Bankruptcy prediction models are important for the various parties related to the 
company: 
a. Banks use bankruptcy prediction models to assess the credit risk (Hol 
2007). 
b. Institutional investors and business angels use bankruptcy prediction 
models in investing and lending (Dimitras et al. 1996). 
c. Bankruptcy of a company may affect employees, customers, vendors and 
consumers. It could lead to a bankruptcy of a related enterprise (Wu 2010; 
Jackson, Wood 2013). 
d. Prediction models give an early warning and leave a substantial amount of 
time for the management to address the situation (Dimitras et al. 1996). 
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2) The statistical methods of bankruptcy prediction models enable to analyze, which 
financial ratios are the most efficient to classify enterprises as “bankrupt” and 
“non-bankrupt” (Altman, 1968). 
The first scientist to create bankruptcy prediction model using multiple variables was 
Edward Altman (1968), who later conducted more than 150 studies over the period of 30 
years (Berzkalne, Zelgalve 2013). His Z-score is still widely used and proven to be quite 
accurate in different industries and countries. Nevertheless, higher model accuracy is not 
assured with a greater number of factors, because a model with just two factors could 
predict failure as accurately as a model with 21 factors (Gissel et al. 2006). 
Altman’s Models 
The best known bankruptcy model is a MDA model called Altman’s Z´-score. The model 
analyzed financial data of 33 distressed US companies and 33 sound US enterprises. At 
the beginning, Altman considered 22 financial ratios, but only five were included in the 
model: working capital/total assets (X1), measuring the company’s ability to cover its 
short term financial obligations; retained earnings/total assets (X2), measuring 
profitability that reflects the company’s age and earning power; earnings before interest 
and taxes/total assets (X3), as a measure of the asset productivity; market value of 
equity/book value of total liabilities (X4), measuring the maximum decline of the asset 
value, before the liabilities exceed the assets and the company becomes insolvent; 
sales/total assets (X5), i.e. the capital turnover ratio, showing the ability of the company’s 
assets to generate sales (Altman, 1968): 
(1) Z =  1.2𝑋1 +  1.4𝑋2 + 3.3𝑋3 +  0.6𝑋4 + 0.999𝑋5 
Altman’s (1968) model has a specified range from 1.89 to 2.99. All firms having Z-score 
of greater than 2.99 are considered in a group of “non-bankrupt”, while those having a Z-
score below 1.81 are in a group of “bankrupt”. The area in between is defined as “zone 
of ignorance” or “gray area”, because of the sensibility for error classification. Fulmer et 
al. (1984) later pointed out, that Altman considered only large firms in his research, with 
average total assets of 100 million dollars. In addition, Eidleman (1995) cautioned that 
the sales/total asset ratio varies significantly by industry. Considering the remarks of his 
colleagues, Altman recommended a correction in the model that eliminates the Sales/total 
assets ratio (Huo 2006): 
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(2) Z =  6.56𝑋1 +  3.26𝑋2 + 6.72𝑋3 +  1.05𝑋4 
It also establishes new range for Z-score. All firms having Z-score greater than 2.6 are 
considered in a group of “non-bankrupt”, while those having a Z-score below 1.1 are in 
a group of “bankrupt”. The “zone of ignorance” is in range 1.1 – 2.6 (Eidelman 1995). 
Although, there are several new bankruptcy prediction models nowadays, the Z-score is 
still frequently used. For example, Mark Uebergang (2006) applied it in 2006, on a sample 
of 84 ASX (Australian Securities Exchange) listed companies, which had experienced 
insolvency. The outcome was that Altman’s Z-score is still adequate and is able to detect 
financial distress not only in US entities, but even in Australian entities. 
In 2014, Altman conducted another paper on bankruptcy prediction, where he reviewed 
and altered his Altman Z´´- score. It was improved by the re-estimation, using logistic 
regression analysis (LRA) instead of MDA, because LRA would perform better on a 
larger sample. In all, the sample includes financial data from 2 602 563 survived and 
38 215 failed firms. 
In this case, LRA creates a score (logit) L for every firm. This score will be used later in 
the equation to determine the conditional probability of failure: 
(3) 𝑝(𝑌 = 1|𝑋) =
1
1+𝑒−𝐿
=
1
1+𝑒−(𝑏0+𝑏1𝑋1+…+𝑏4𝑋4)
  
L =  0.035 −  0.495𝑋1 –  0.862𝑋2 –  1.721𝑋3 –  0.017𝑋4 
where bi (i =0,…, 4) are the coefficients and Xi (i =1,…, 4) are the four independent 
variables of the original Z´´-score model. The model was named Z´´-Score LR-model.  
If the result of this equation should be equal or above 0.5, the firm is considered to be 
heading towards bankruptcy. If the result should be below 0.5, then the firm is not heading 
for bankruptcy.  
Stahlman’s Model 
Stahlman (2015) created a manufacturing industry bankruptcy prediction model, based 
on the financial data of micro and small enterprises all over Europe. He included four 
variables into his model: 
1) X1 - EBITDA to debt ratio (EBITDA / Total debt); 
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2) X2 - Equity ratio (Total equity / Total assets); 
3) X3 - Asset turnover (Turnover / Total assets); 
4) X4 - Cash ratio (Cash / Short-term liabilities). 
These variables are used in the bankruptcy prediction model as follows: 
(4)      P(𝑌𝑖 = 1) =
1
1+𝑒−𝑍𝑖
 
Z =  0.785 −  4.011𝑋1 –  0.692𝑋2 –  0.338𝑋3 –  2.149𝑋4 
If the result of this equation should be equal or above 0.5, the firm is considered to be 
heading towards bankruptcy. If the result should be below 0.5, then the firm is not heading 
for bankruptcy.  
The model came out to be statistically significant and the overall classification accuracy 
was 78.3%. In most of the European countries, the model proved to be accurate, being in 
the range of 75.0-89.4%, whereas in Estonia, it was significantly lower at 65.4%. 
Variables in Permanent Insolvency Prediction Models 
From the beginning, financial ratios have been introduced as characteristics that are able 
to predict the failure of a firm (Dimitras et al. 1996). Analyzing and comparing different 
prediction models assure, that the range of financial ratios, which are considered for 
insolvency prediction, is very wide. Therefore, deeper research had to be done to create 
a more unique set of variables that would be the basis of the model created in this paper.  
Laitinen (1992) implies, that the failure for newly founded firms could be predicted with 
eight financial factors. Additionally, all the financial factors, which have been used over 
time in different prediction models, can be classified into three commonly used categories 
(Altman et al. 2014; Laitinen 1992; Makeeva, Neretina 2013; Huang et al. 2008; Courtis 
1978): 
1) Profitability; 
2) Liquidity; 
3) Solvency. 
Dimitras et al. (1996) summarized 47 articles into one research, creating an overview of 
59 models and a detailed listing of the financial ratios included in the models. According 
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to Bellovary et al. (2007), the number factors or variables in one study range from one to 
fifty-seven. They also state that by 2007, there were more than 752 different variables 
used in the studies, and that 42 of these factors are considered to be most common.  
Based on the information from Makeeva and Naretina (2013) and Dimitras et al. (1996), 
the author categorized the factors that were provided by Bellovary et al. (2007). The 
results are presented in table 1, which lists financial ratios that are considered in the 
highest number of studies and are classified into three categories mentioned earlier. 
Table 1. The most popular financial ratios by their classification. 
Category Financial ratio 
Number 
of Studies 
Profitability 
Net income / Total assets 54 
Retained earnings / Total assets 42 
Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets 35 
Sales (turnover) / Total assets 32 
Earnings before interest and taxes / Interest 10 
Liquidity 
Current assets / Current liabilities 51 
Working capital / Total assets 45 
Quick ratio 30 
Cash / Current Liabilities 26 
Current assets / Total assets  23 
Cash / Total assets 18 
Solvency 
Total debt / Total assets 27 
Total liabilities / Total assets 19 
Market value of equity / Book value of total debt 16 
Current liabilities / Total assets 13 
Source: Dimitras et al. (1996), Bellovary et al. (2007), Makeeva, Neretina (2013). Notes: 
Financial ratios were categorized according to Makeeva and Neretina (2013:75) and Dimitras et 
al. (1996:493). Information about the financial ratios and the number of studies came from 
Bellovary et al. (2007:42). 
As shown in table 1, the most widely used factor comes from profitability category and 
is the ratio of Net Income to Total Assets, which is included in 54 studies. Due to the 
similar nature, many prediction models use EBIT to Total Assets instead of Net Income 
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to Total assets. The best known universal bankruptcy prediction model, which is Altman’s 
Z-score, uses EBIT to Total assets instead of Net income to Total Assets. That said, 
Altman’s Z´´-score model has all of its four ratios listed in the 15 most used factors table, 
while Stahlman has only its asset ratio listed in the table. 
Data and Method 
Estonian Star-up Grants 
This paper uses governmental start-up grants as the basis of the analysis. The period in 
this research includes start-up grants that were paid out between 2004 and 2009 by 
Enterprise Estonia. In this period, there were two different grant programs: Start-up firm’s 
start-grant 2004-2006 and Star-up firm’s start-grant and growth grant 2007-2013.  
Start-up grants can be used to finance the purchase of fixed assets needed in firm’s 
business process. That includes transportation, set-up and other costs that are directly 
related to implementation of fixed asset. In recent years, the program will also cover the 
costs of certain type of software, patents and even marketing costs. 
It is worth mentioning that before the 16th of August 2009, only firms that where 
registered outside of Estonian capital Tallinn, were eligible for applying grants from 
Enterprise Estonia (Start-up firm’s… 2009). This is the main reason why the majority of 
firms presented in this paper are registered out of Tallinn. 
The legal framework for start-up grant is created by the acts of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Communication (Start-up firm’s… 2004; Star-up firm’s… 2008; Start-up 
firm’s… 2009). The first act came into force on the 26th of April 2004 and all grants given 
out until the next act were regulated by these rules. The next act came into force on the 
8th of February 2008, and after various changes that eased the preconditions to qualify for 
the grant, the final act that is adequate for this research came into force on 30th of August 
2009. 
Table 2 presents prerequisites that were regulated by different acts. All acts stated the 
same limits for age of applying firm, maximum number of employees and revenue or 
balance limits. The difference lays in the margin of grant funding limit and the grants 
amount. 
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Table 2. Prerequisites of start-up grant acts from 2004 till 2009. 
 
Prerequisite 
First act 
(2004) 
Second act 
(02.2008) 
Second act 
(09.2009) 
Age of applying firm, months < 12 < 12 < 12 
Maximum number of employees 50 50 50 
Maximum Revenue/balance sheet, 
mln euros 
3.2/1.6 3.2/1.6 3.2/1.6 
Limit of grant funding of total 
investment, % 
75 75 80 
Maximum grant amount, euros 10 226 3 196 6 391 
Source: Start-up firm’s… 2004; Star-up firm’s… 2008; Start-up firm’s… 2009. 
Empirical Data 
Compilation of the sample used data from three sources: Enterprise Estonia, Estonian 
Business Register and Estonian Tax and Customs Board. The first input of data came 
from Enterprise Estonia, where the author could find all firms that had applied and 
received start-up grant from January 2004 to December 2013. At this time, there was 2855 
firms in the sample. 
Given the fact that the main purpose of this analysis is to find the difference between 
survived and permanently insolvent firms during first five years of existence, it was 
essential to distinguish these two groups of grant recipients. To achieve the main purpose, 
permanently insolvent firms had to be identified. Permanently insolvent group of firms 
included companies that declared the ending of the business during the first five years 
after receiving start-up grant. 
The first group of permanently insolvent firms were identified by declared bankruptcy or 
abatement of bankruptcy proceeding. Secondly, firms that were in liquidation process, 
already liquidated or deleted, were also added to permanently insolvent group of firms. 
Deleting entry is a consequence of failing to declare your fiscal year report for multiple 
years in a row. Deleting entry will be done by Estonian Business Registry without the 
permission of the owner. Liquidation is carried out with the consent of the owner. The 
next step was to identify tax arrears among these firms. 
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Deleting entry and liquidation had to be caused by permanent insolvency. Therefore, 
having consecutive tax arrears for at least six months before deleting or liquidating the 
firm, is considered adequate proof of permanent insolvency. The result of this 
classification was that 2402 firms were still operating five years after receiving start-up 
grant and 182 that did not. Information about the ending clause was available from Centre 
of Registers and Information Systems (Estonian Business Register data) and information 
regarding tax arrears was provided by the Estonian Tax and Customs Board. 
The time criterion of the sample declares, that the period being analyzed for each firm 
consists of five consecutive years starting from the year of receiving the grant. If a firm 
receives the grant in first three months of 2005, then this would be the start of the five-
year period that ends with the year 2009. If the grant is received after the first three months 
of the year, then the basis of the period would be 2006 and period ends with 2010. This 
would provide enough financial information for analysis and also makes the sample more 
homogeneous. 
As the critical part of the analysis is the availability of fiscal year report, the author applied 
this as the third criterion on the sample. The five-year criterion establishes that there 
should be five consecutive annual reports for all survived firms. The group of 
permanently insolvent firms would end the business in this five-year period and they 
should have financial information in their annual reports for at least two years after 
receiving the grant. These reports were made available by the Center of Registers and 
Information Systems, who holds annual reports of Estonian firms as publicly available 
information.  
To avoid including inactive firms in analysis a criterion had to be applied. The solution 
was to add a lower limit for turnover. The lowest bar to meet the criteria was 16 000 euros 
of turnover during the both first two years. After all these corrections 478 firms were left 
in the sample in total, which split into 403 survived firms and 75 firms that had gone 
bankrupt or ended the business due to permanent insolvency. 
Some of the survived firms had persistent tax arrears for at least six months before the 
ending of the five-year period. To be certain, that these firms would not alter the outcome 
of the analysis, it is necessary to test the model using two different options: group 1, 
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which includes these firms in the group of survived firms and group 2, which excludes 
these firms entirely. 
Statistical Method 
Due to the nature of this research, (binary) logistic regression analysis will be applied for 
the entire sample as to identify the financial variables that are significantly different 
between two groups of firms. The dependent variable Y = 0 when the firm is permanently 
insolvent and Y = 1 when it survived. LRA model presumes, that the two groups must be 
accurately distinguished (Balcaen, Ooghe 2006).  
The strength of association is assessed by the standard tests for LRA such as the R2 Square 
and the Nagelkerke adjusted R2. The number of survived firms is high in comparison with 
the permanently insolvent firms. However, it is logical to assume that permanently 
insolvent and survived firms affect the conditional probability of insolvency with equal 
weights. Therefore, the two groups are weighted in the way that permanently insolvent 
and survived firms get equal weights in estimation, but the number of firms is set equal 
to the original sample size. The weighting of observations remarkably affects the 
statistical tests as was noted by Laitinen and Suvas (2013). 
LRA creates a score (logit) L for every firm. This score is used to determine the 
conditional probability of failure as follows (Altman et al. 2014): 
(5)   𝑝(𝑌 = 1|𝑋) =
1
1+𝑒−𝐿
=
1
1+𝑒−(𝑏0+𝑏1𝑋1+…+𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑛)
 
where bi (i =0,…, 6) are the coefficients and Xi (i =1,…, n) are the six independent 
variables that will be introduced in the next section.  
The analysis part of the paper was carried out with the help of statistical software IBM 
SPSS Statistics 20. Considering the fact that there are two first years of operations under 
examination, both years must be analyzed separately. Moreover, there are two different 
groups of survived firms, because some of these enterprises had compiling tax arrears in 
six consecutive months before the end of the five-year term. In the light of previous notes, 
four separate logistic regression analysis were carried out: 
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LR analysis 1. 1st years financial variables of survived group of firms, which 
consists of survived firms with and without tax arrears (Y = 1) and other group 
consisted of firms that became permanently insolvent (Y = 0). 
LR analysis 2. 2nd years financial variables of survived group of firms, which 
consists of survived firms with and without tax arrears (Y = 1) and other group 
consisted of firms that became permanently insolvent (Y = 0). 
LR analysis 3. 1st years financial variables of survived group of firms, which 
consists of only survived firms without tax arrears (Y = 1) and other group 
consisted of firms that became permanently insolvent (Y = 0). 
LR analysis 4. 2nd years financial variables of survived group of firms, which 
consists of only survived firms without tax arrears (Y = 1) and other group 
consisted of firms that became permanently insolvent (Y = 0). 
Financial Ratios Applied in Modelling 
The analysis will include only the first two years of financial data for each firm. Financial 
data is necessary for calculating the variables that will be covariates in the logit model. 
Including a high number of financial variables in the model may lead to multi-collinearity, 
so that the model coefficients can be strongly influenced.  
In literature review, three categories of variables were listed. For this research, all these 
categories will be represented at least with one variable. In the light of given data, 
variables for this model are considered to be as followed: 
a. the liquidity (Cash_SL), measured as cash stock/short-term liabilities; 
b. the ability to pay off its liabilities (CA_SL), measured as current assets/short-
term liabilities; 
c. the business scale of the company (Turn_TA), measured as turnover/total assets; 
d. the company’s financial leverage (Eq_TA), measured as equity/total assets; 
e. the asset productivity (NI_TA), measured as net income/total assets; 
f. the profit margin (NI_Turn), measured as net income/turnover. 
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Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents first year’s descriptive statistics of the six independent variables (X1-X6) 
that were used in this research. The results include survived firms and permanently 
insolvent firms, which are presented in the table as failed. In case of survived firms two 
different grouping options are used, where Group 1 consists of survived firms with and 
without tax arrears and Group 2 consists of only firms that did not have any tax arrears. 
Failed group represents only permanently insolvent firms. The standard deviation shows 
that the variation in the ratios is significant. For all the variables, the means significantly 
exceed the median for both failed and survived firms, indicating a positively skewed 
distribution.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for first year. 
  
Variable 
Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Failed Survived Failed Survived Failed Survived 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Group 
1 
Group  
2 
Cash_SL 0.3959 1.2042 1.3117 0.1081 0.3069 0.3153 0.7469 2.7482 2.9444 
CA_SL 1.0949 2.4723 2.6012 0.8068 1.0712 1.0866 0.9962 4.9783 5.2706 
Turn_TA 2.4696 2.2632 2.3152 2.2247 1.8122 1.8579 1.7810 1.7917 1.8078 
Eq_TA 0.3958 0.4146 0.4200 0.2092 0.3779 0.3819 1.0071 0.2848 0.2911 
NI_TA 0.2798 0.2514 0.2590 0.0834 0.1868 0.1870 0.8918 0.2391 0.2479 
NI_Turn 0.1213 0.1586 0.1593 0.0513 0.1005 0.1017 0.1981 0.2063 0.2101 
Notes: Survived firms with tax arrears consist of 403 companies. Survived firms without tax 
arrears consist of 342 companies. Failed companies consist of 75 firms. 
Table 4 presents second year’s descriptive statistics of those six variables. The standard 
deviation shows that the variation in the ratios is as significant as for the first year. For 
all the variables, the means significantly exceed the median for both failed and survived 
firms, indicating a positively skewed distribution. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for second year. 
  
Variable 
Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Failed Survived Failed Survived Failed Survived 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Cash_SL 0.2340 1.6107 1.7960 0.0635 0.2794 0.3134 0.4431 5.6852 6.1400 
CA_SL 0.8383 2.9023 3.1337 0.6682 1.2174 1.2641 0.6574 7.7652 8.3771 
Turn_TA 2.5834 2.1477 2.2023 2.0029 1.7422 1.8051 1.9939 1.5696 1.5948 
Eq_TA 0.3973 0.4431 0.4561 0.2172 0.3938 0.4257 1.2786 0.3001 0.3085 
NI_TA 0.1934 0.2125 0.2220 0.1227 0.1468 0.1547 0.2139 0.2340 0.2397 
NI_Turn 0.0903 0.1377 0.1424 0.0496 0.0775 0.0784 0.1002 0.1796 0.1846 
Notes: Survived firms with tax arrears consist of 403 companies. Survived firms without tax 
arrears consist of 342 companies. Failed companies consist of 75 firms. 
Table 5 presents ANOVA and Independent Samples Median Test (ISMT) results (p-
values) through all variables and taxonomies applied in the evaluation. In case of both 
tests the p-values <0.05 are considered to reflect significant differences in this study. Only 
ratios Cash_LS and CA_SL are statistically significant for both years on both tests, 
indicating, that these variables could be important discriminators of failed and survived 
firms. The means of Cash_SL and CA_SL were significantly higher for survived 
companies on the second year, whereas it was much higher for failed companies on the 
first year. The mean and median values of Cash_SL and CA_SL showed several times 
higher results on survived firms, which is also expected as the surviving firms tend to 
have more liquid assets. The biggest difference between survived and failed companies 
showed the liquidity ratio Cash_SL, where the mean values differed more than six times 
and median values more than four times. The median test (ISMT) showed, that Eq_TA, 
NI_TA and NI_Turn ratios are statistically significant in the first year. All of them had a 
median value for survived companies almost twice as high as for failed companies.  
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Table 5. ANOVA (Brown-Forsyth) and Independent Samples Median Test (ISMT) 
results (p-values) through all variables and taxonomies applied. 
Variables Year Test 
P-values 
Group 1 Group 2 
Cash_SL 
1 
ANOVA 0.000* 0.000* 
ISMT 0.003+ 0.002+ 
2 
ANOVA 0.000* 0.000* 
ISMT 0.000+ 0.000+ 
CA_SL 
1 
ANOVA 0.000* 0.000* 
ISMT 0.024+ 0.023+ 
2 
ANOVA 0.000* 0.000* 
ISMT 0.000+ 0.000+ 
Turn_TA 
1 
ANOVA 0.359 0.499 
ISMT 0.615 0.594 
2 
ANOVA 0.076 0.124 
ISMT 0.451 0.594 
Eq_TA 
1 
ANOVA 0.873 0.837 
ISMT 0.000+ 0.000+ 
2 
ANOVA 0.758 0.694 
ISMT 0.000+ 0.000+ 
NI_TA 
1 
ANOVA 0.785 0.842 
ISMT 0.044+ 0.044+ 
2 
ANOVA 0.487 0.308 
ISMT 0.615 0.458 
NI_Turn 
1 
ANOVA 0.140 0.140 
ISMT 0.012+ 0.011+ 
2 
ANOVA 0.001* 0.001* 
ISMT 0.209 0.132 
Notes: * indicates that ANOVA p-value =< 0.05. + indicates that Independent Samples Median 
Test p-value =< 0.05. Group 1 consists of 403 survived and 75 permanently insolvent companies. 
Group 2 consists of 342 survived and 75 permanently insolvent companies. 
LR Model for All Survived and Permanently Insolvent Firms 
As described in table 6, the results of the first LR analysis show, that during the first 
financial year after receiving the governmental start-up grant, the liquidity ratio Cash 
Stock to Short-term Liabilities is the only financial variable from this research, which 
could predict permanent insolvency. Decrease in the value of this ratio will increase the 
probability of permanent insolvency. 
Table 6. Variables in the equation from LR analysis 1. 
Variables B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Cash_SL 0.432 0.108 16.126 1 0.000 1.541 
Constant -0.271 0.108 6.251 1 0.012 0.763 
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Table 7 shows the overall predictive performance of the first LR model is 59.7%. The 
group of permanently insolvent firms obtained 84.0% classification accuracy, while the 
group of survived firms obtained only 35.5% classification accuracy. Applying Altman’s 
Z´´-score to the same sample resulted overall classification accuracy of 44.6% (84% on 
survived firms and only 5.3% on permanently insolvent firms). Stahlman’s model showed 
a little better results based on the first test’s sample. Although, it resulted 90.1% 
classification accuracy on survived companies, it failed with the result of 12% on 
permanently insolvent companies, all of which makes 51.1% overall predictive 
performance. Z´´-score LR-model failed to identify any permanently insolvent firms and 
classified all the firms in the sample as survived. 
Table 7. Prediction accuracy of the LR analysis 1. 
Observed 
Predicted 
Y = 0 Y= 1 % Correct 
Y = 0 201 38 84.0 
Y = 1 154 85 35.5 
Overall %   59.7 
Table 8 shows the results of the second LR analysis, which indicates that financial ratios 
significant in the LR model for the second year differed from those significant in the 
model for the first year. The predictors which could be included to the model are the 
profitability ratio Net Income to Turnover and liquidity ratio Current Assets to Short-term 
Liabilities. Decrease in the value of those ratios will increase the probability of permanent 
insolvency.  It is worth mentioning, that the second year’s LR analysis only included five 
variables of the six, because two profitability variables showed multicollinearity and only 
the variable with the highest classification accuracy was included. 
Table 8. Variables in the equation from LR analysis 2. 
Variables B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
NI_Turn 1.675 0.752 4.955 1 0.026 5.338 
CA_SL 0.716 0.119 35.985 1 0.000 2.046 
Constant -1.063 0.175 36.929 1 0.000 0.346 
Table 9 shows that the overall predictive performance of the second LR model is 65.6%. 
The group of permanently insolvent firms obtained 81.3% classification accuracy, while 
the group of survived firms obtained 49.9%. Altman’s Z´´-score showed overall 
classification accuracy of 44.1% (85.5% on survived firms and only 2.7% on permanently 
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insolvent firms). Stahlman’s model showed better results based on the second test’s 
sample. It resulted 91.6% classification accuracy on survived companies, but it failed with 
the result of 18.7% on permanently insolvent companies, resulting 55.1% in overall 
predictive performance. Altman’s LR-model failed to identify any permanently insolvent 
firms and classified all the firms in the sample as survived. 
Table 9. Prediction accuracy of the LR analysis 2. 
Observed 
Predicted 
Y = 0 Y= 1 % Correct 
Y = 0 194 45 81.3 
Y = 1 120 119 49.9 
Overall %   65.6 
 
LR Model for Survived Without Defaults and Permanently Insolvent Firms 
Table 10 shows the results of the third LR analysis, which indicates that during the first 
financial year after receiving the governmental start-up grant, the liquidity ratio, Cash 
Stock to Short-term Liabilities, is the only financial variable from this test, which could 
predict permanent insolvency. Decrease in the value of this ratio will increase the 
probability of permanent insolvency. 
Table 10. Variables in the equation from LR analysis 3. 
Variables B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Cash_SL 0.451 0.115 15.385 1 0.000 1.570 
Constant -0.292 0.116 6.293 1 0.012 0.747 
Table 11 shows, that the overall predictive performance of the third LR model is 59.8%. 
The group of permanently insolvent firms obtained 84.0% classification accuracy, while 
the group of survived firms obtained only 35.7% classification accuracy. Altman’s Z´´-
score had 45.3% overall predictive performance (84.9% classification accuracy on 
survived firms and 5.3% on permanently insolvent firms). Stahlman’s model showed 
91.3% classification accuracy on survived companies and 12% on permanently insolvent 
companies, which resulted 51.6% overall. Altman’s LR-model failed to identify any 
permanently insolvent firms and classified all the firms in the sample as survived. 
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Table 11. Prediction accuracy of the LR analysis 3. 
Observed 
Predicted 
Y = 0 Y= 1 % Correct 
Y = 0 175 33 84.0 
Y = 1 134 74 35.7 
Overall %   59.8 
As described in table 12, the results of the fourth LR analysis show, that during the second 
financial year after receiving the governmental start-up grant, the significant financial 
ratios differed from the first year’s results. Significant variables in the model are the 
profitability ratio Net Income to Turnover and liquidity ratio Current Assets to Short-term 
Liabilities. Decrease in the value of those ratios will increase the probability of permanent 
insolvency. The fourth test, like the second test, also included only five variables for the 
same reasons. 
Table 12. Variables in the equation from LR analysis 4. 
Variables B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
NI_Turn 1.855 0.812 5.215 1 0.022 6.389 
CA_SL 0.736 0.128 32.818 1 0.000 2.088 
Constant -1.125 0.190 35.123 1 0.000 0.325 
Table 13 shows that the overall predictive performance of the fourth LR model is 67.9%. 
The group of permanently insolvent firms obtained 84.0% classification accuracy, while 
the group of survived firms got 51.8%. Applying Altman’s Z´´-score to the same sample 
resulted 44.2% classification accuracy (85.7% on survived firms and 2.7% on 
permanently insolvent firms). Stahlman’s model showed 55.4% overall predictive 
performance (92.1% classification accuracy on survived companies and 18.7% on 
permanently insolvent companies). LR-model failed to identify any permanently 
insolvent firms and classified all the firms in the sample as survived. 
Table 13. Prediction accuracy of the LR analysis 4. 
Observed 
Predicted 
Y = 0 Y= 1 % Correct 
Y = 0 175 33 84.0 
Y = 1 101 108 51.8 
Overall %   67.9 
  
25 
 
Conclusion 
The prediction of failure of newly founded firms has received scant attention in the 
literature, but there are no studies specifically focusing on government supported start-
ups. Still, this is an important knowledge for business owners, clients, creditors and 
possible buyers to assess the risks of a potential insolvency. The purpose of this study 
was to create a reliable prediction model that could predict a possible permanent 
insolvency of a newly founded firm, which has been granted a governmental start-up 
grant. 
Six financial ratios from different categories, from one and two years after firm 
foundation, were applied in logistic regression analysis to find out the best determinants 
of start-up firm failure. According to the logit model, only the Cash to Short-term 
liabilities ratio enables to predict firm failure one year after foundation, whereas 
profitability ratio Net Income to Turnover and liquidity ratio Current Assets to Short-term 
Liabilities enables to predict it two years after foundation. 
The sample that was used to create the model was later tested with three different 
universal bankruptcy prediction models. Applying these models on the sample proved, 
that universal bankruptcy prediction models are inefficient in predicting the failure of 
Estonian start-up firms supported by government, as their prediction accuracies remain 
in most cases below 50%. Thus, besides the scientific essence of finding out the best post-
foundation predictors for such firms, the results of the study are applicable in practice by 
different stakeholders when making financing decisions. For example, Enterprise Estonia 
can use this model to evaluate whether to hand out a growth support to a firm that already 
has received a start-up grant.  
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